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The implications of mandatory low-cost fuel provision 
 
Abstract 
This work studies fuel retail firms’ strategic behavior in a two-dimensional product 
differentiation framework. Following the mandatory provision of “low-cost” fuel we 
consider that capacity constraints force firms to eliminate of one the previously offered 
qualities. Firms play a two-stage game choosing fuel qualities from three possibilities 
(low-cost, medium quality and high quality fuel) and then prices having exogenous 
opposite locations. In the highest level of consumers’ heterogeneity, a subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium exists in which firms both choose minimum quality differentiation. 
Consumers’ are worse off if no differentiation occurs in medium and high qualities. The 
effect over prices from the mandatory “low-cost” fuel law is ambiguous. 
Keywords: two-dimensional product differentiation; heterogeneous quality 




 1 Introduction 
On April 17th of 2015 new legislation imposed gas stations to provide a no-additives fuels 
(“low-cost” or simple fuels) option to consumers in Portugal.
1
 Independently of the brand 
simple fuels’ level of additives is that needed to meet minimum quality requirements 
defined by law.
 2
 These fuels are similar to those sold by large retail chains and unbranded 
operators. Over the past decade independent/unbranded gasoline stations selling exclusively 
low-cost fuels have been gaining market share to branded stations.
 3
 Unbranded stations are 
usually operated by large grocery retailers and located next to their stores while branded 
stations often provide ancillary services such as car wash, tire-fill, loyalty cards, and 
products of convenience. Fuels can be categorized in three segments according to its 
quality: regular (simple or low-cost), medium and premium. Premium fuels are the top-
quality fuels, with the highest concentrations of additives and the simple fuels are those 
with lower concentrations of additives. To justify this policy, the government argued that it 
would promote competition lowering prices for the consumer and more freedom of choice. 
Major branded fuel retailers’ stations criticized the measure, arguing that their business 
model involves other costs that would prevent them to keep up with unbranded stations 
prices for low-cost fuel.
4
 Another argument against the measure was the possible damage to 
the freedom of choice given that capacity constraints would dictate the elimination of other 
                                                          
1
 Law no. 6/2015: http://goo.gl/UA4mJy 
2
 Decree law no. 142/2010, of 31 December 
3
 According to the Portuguese Competition Authority between 2008 and 2013 low-cost fuels market share 
grew from 12% to 25%. In 2015 a study by Kantar contracted by the Portuguese Association of Distribution 
Companies indicates that low-cost fuels account for more than 28% of the market. 
4
 Four oil companies operating in Portugal (Galp, Repsol, BP and Cepsa) offering branded fuels and freely 
deciding on their recommended and maximum prices. Please refer to OECD (2014) to a more detailed 
description of the market organization. 
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qualities in order to offer low quality fuel. Mandatory introduction of simple fuel and 
stations’ capacity constraints forced firms to choose which of the qualities (standard or 
premium) should be replaced for the former. The choice of which quality to eliminate can 
be seen as a strategic one, from which a game between firms emerge. Firms decide by 
anticipating other firms’ and consumers’ behavior as well as prices and profits resulting 
from competitive interactions. Naturally, differences in quality, location, production costs 
and consumers’ tastes influence the market dynamics. Profits will ultimately determine 
which products will be available in the market. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 a contextualization of this paper in the 
existing literature is made. Section 3 introduces a description of the different models used 
to analyzed competition under two-dimensional product differentiation. In Section 4 each 
model is developed. Equilibrium prices, demands and strategies’ payoffs are found and 
main results are exposed.
5
 Finally, Section 5 presents concluding remarks. 
2 Literature Review 
Competition in fuel/gasoline retail market has been recurrently the core of many empirical 
studies over the last decades. Most literature focus on the study of two important 
phenomena: asymmetric Edgeworth price cycles and collusion behavior.
6
 Maskin and 
Tirole (1988) first formalized the Edgeworth cycle concept, describing it as an equilibrium 
where “firms undercut each other successively until the price reaches the competitive level 
at which point some firm eventually reverts to the high price”. Several works (e.g., Noel, 
                                                          
5
 For the third model further analysis regarding equilibrium prices and welfare is performed. 
6
 Edgeworth (1925) argued that stationary price equilibrium doesn’t take place when firms are confronted 
with capacity constraints. The concept was later formalized by Maskin and Tirole (1988)  
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2004; Verlinda, 2008; Noel, 2011) find proof that firms engage in Edgeworth cycles’ 
behavior, leading to a fast price increase and a slower price decrease stages. Others focus 
on the speed of price adjustments to cost variations. Bacon (1991), Borenstein et al. (1992), 
Golby et al. (2000), Johnson (2002) used significant datasets to confirm asymmetries in 
price adjustments also known as “rockets rise faster and feather fall slower” events. 
Borenstein (1997) explains such asymmetry with the uncertainty of competitors’ costs, but 
others such as Johnson (2002) explain it with the incentives for buyers to engage more 
intensively in searching prices. Relevant works also focused on tacit collusion between 
firms in retail fuel markets. Such behavior may be related to asymmetric price adjustments 
which provides strong reasons to study firms’ strategic behavior.
7
 Supported by distinct 
theoretical models, important empirical works (Shepard and Borenstein, 1996; Wang, 2008; 
García, 2010) provide strong evidence of collusive behavior in different fuels retail 
markets.  
Representing fuel market’s organization and dynamics is not an easy task. Fuels can easily 
be considered to be differentiated over two dimensions: vertical and horizontal. While 
literature addressing one dimensional product differentiation is extensive, works 
accommodating the two dimensions are not as common. Hotelling (1929) made one of the 
first attempts to model horizontal differentiation, where firms compete in a two-stage 
location-price game.
8
 A significant number works followed further exploring Hotelling-
type models. Either by considering a circular city, free entry and large number of firms as 
Salop, 1979) or key calculations’ corrections and quadratic transportation costs 
                                                          
7
 Clark and Houde (2011) identified evidence of asymmetric pricing cycles being an important feature 
associated with a price-fixing cartel. 
8
 First choosing locations (in a unitary “linear city”) and then prices of homogeneous products. 
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(d’Aspremont et al. 1979) location models have been widely used. Concerning the vertical 
dimension Gabszwicz and Thisse (1979, 1980) tried to “capture an important fact of life: 
the quality component of the choice in economic decisions” accommodating consumers’ 
with similar tastes but distinct income and firms with substitute products competing in the 
same market. Shaked and Sutton (1982) extended the exercise by considering a previous 
stage where two firms choose or not to enter the market and then to decide on maximal or 
minimal quality differentiation.
9
 Similarly to location models, in quality differentiation 
usual results show differentiation being a way to soften price competition and exploit 
consumers’ surplus. Some literature has developed competition models encompassing both 
vertical and horizontal dimensions. Economides (1989) analyses a sequential game of 
variety(location)-quality-price choices to find evidence of maximally differentiated 
varieties but minimal differentiation on the other dimensions. This result is consistent with 
that of Irmen (1988) –firms identify a dominant dimension to maximally differentiate in 
while minimum differentiation holds for all other dimensions.
10
 Other literature also 
provides interesting results in the two-dimensional framework but do not closely relate to 
the scope of this work.
11
 Although with significant similarities in what concerns to models 
specification to my best knowledge none of the existing literature focuses on firms’ 
decisions about quality differentiation arising from both public intervention and capacity 
constraints – the core issue of the present document. 
                                                          
9
 Results yielded both firms entering the market and producing differentiated products which would allow 
for price competition to be relaxed and positive firms for both firms. 
10
 Conceptualized by Hotelling (1929). 
11
 Tabuchi (1994) focuses on the conditions necessary for equilibrium to occur when duopolistic firms are 
not allowed to take mixed strategies (in a two-dimensional two-stage game); and Degryse (1996) studies the 
interaction between vertical and horizontal differentiation in banking services.  
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3 The Models 
All following models consider product differentiation occurring in horizontal and vertical 
dimensions. Horizontal dimension respects to the firm’s location (y) while vertical 
differentiation refers to quality. With two products horizontal differentiation means that at 
the same price consumers do not agree on the preferable product. When vertical 
differentiation occurs all consumers agree on the most preferable product.
12
 Each consumer 
is characterized by its location, usually also referred to as preference for variety (x, x ϵ 
[0;1]) and its preference for quality (𝜃, 𝜃 ϵ [𝜃; 𝜃]). Each product is characterized by its 
location and quality. For all cases studied it is assumed that firms cannot change from an 
exogenous location. We assume that firm 1 is has location 𝑦 = 0 and firm 2 is located at 
𝑦 = 1.13 
3.1. Homogeneous consumers and two qualities 
In the first model firms cannot choose the quality of its fuels in a continuum of quality, as 
consumers perceive the market by 3 categories. Instead firms have to choose between 
offering the high quality fuel or the medium quality (as low-cost quality is mandatory by 
law and only two slots for quality offer exist in fuel stations). 
In this duopoly firms simultaneously compete in qualities in the first stage and in prices in 
the second stage. Having capacity constraints regarding the number of positions it can 
assume in the vertical dimension, each firm faces a choice of quality to offer (whereas the 
                                                          
12
 When products have the same price and location. 
13
 Relevant literature on horizontal differentiation suggests that firms tend to maximize horizontal 
differentiation: d’Aspremont et al. (1979), Netz and Taylor (2002), Economides (1985) and Neven (1985). 
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other quality must be excluded). That choice is made anticipating competitors’ and 
consumers’ behavior.  
3.2. Heterogeneous consumers and two qualities 
Consumers are uniformly distributed over a rectangular space of characteristics. 
Characteristics are each consumer’s location (𝑥) in the unit interval (𝑥 ∈ [0; 1]) and 𝜃, 𝜃 
representing the valuation of quality. While in the previous setting consumers were 
assumed to have equal tastes for quality (𝜃 = 1), here tastes vary across individuals. Such 
as in similar applications –  Economides (1989) – we normalize 𝜃 without loss of generality 
so that 𝜃 ϵ [0; 1]. Consumers are thus uniformly distributed over the unit square 𝑍 =
[0; 1] × [0; 1]. The product space is defined by the quality characteristic delimited by the 
qualities of the lower quality and higher quality fuels (𝑠, 𝑠 𝜖 [𝑠𝐿 , 𝑠𝐻]). Firms’ quality 
choices are not continuous as they can only choose between the lower (𝑠𝐿) and higher 
quality fuels (𝑠𝐻) being therefore restrained from choosing any level of quality in between. 
Figure 1 - Consumers uniformly distribution over the characteristics space 
 
This setting encompasses both 2-dimensions differentiation and varying tastes for quality. 
For each location x, consumers located in the same vertical line (see figure 1) have 
heterogeneous tastes, meaning that consumers are differently “attracted” by quality. 
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3.3. Heterogeneous non-continuous tastes and three qualities 
Although firms’ choice is between premium and regular fuels, the obligation to supply low-
quality fuel certainly influences firm’s decisions. Hence there is interest in examining a 
three-qualities market setting. An ideal exercise would accommodate continuous and 
heterogeneous preferences for quality in the existence of three qualities. The presence of an 
equilibrium would be analyzed as usual in order to assess the possible outcomes of the 
game. Such exercise entails a complex system of equation mainly as a consequence of non-
linear demands, limiting the scope for useful results and implications.   
The following model is, without loss of generality, a simplified alternative that considers a 
concentration of consumers along three different Hoteling lines, each corresponding to 
different levels of taste for quality 𝜃𝐿, 𝜃𝑀and 𝜃𝐻 (with 𝜃𝑙 < 𝜃𝑚 < 𝜃ℎ). Each line has 
length 1 and a mass of 1/3 consumers uniformly distributed over it, ensuring that the total 
mass of consumers is 1, as in the previous exercises. Although the taste for quality is not 
continuous, this ensures a certain degree of heterogeneity in consumers’ tastes for quality. 
The individual consumer utility is given by  
𝑣 +  𝜃𝑠𝑖 −  𝑝 − 𝑡(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) (1) 




and 𝑠𝐿 = 1. Marginal costs of production are quality specific across firms, respecting the 




4 Strategies, Equilibria and Implications 
In the following models we use backward induction to search for the existence of a 
subgame perfect equilibrium. Firms first compete in qualities and then prices. By 
performing the usual profit maximization exercise – after identifying consumers’ 
indifference relations and demands for each product – equilibrium prices are obtained. 
Finally demands and profits resulting from equilibrium prices are found. For each model a 
table of payoffs displays firms’ profits for each outcome. Analysis will focus on the 
existence or not of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in quality, on the different conditions 
for each equilibrium market configuration and on the conditions dictating asymmetric 
quality choices being or not an equilibrium. 
4.1. Homogeneous consumers and two qualities 
The indifferent consumer is located at x where its utility of buying from firm 1 is equal to 
that achieved by buying from firm 2, respecting: 
𝑣 + 𝑠1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑡(𝑥) =  𝑣 + 𝑠2 − 𝑝2 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥) (2)  
Hence the indifferent consumer is located at: 
𝑥 =
𝑠1 − 𝑠2 + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 + 𝑡
2𝑡
 (3) 
Note that because x is increasing in 𝑠1and decreasing in 𝑠2 it is clear that the higher firm’s 1 
quality is compared to 2’s, the higher will be its market. Because all consumers located in 
the interval [0; x(t)] derive more utility from purchasing from firm 1, (3) gives us the 
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demand for firm 1 (1 − 𝐷1 = 𝐷2). To ensure that a firm is never priced out of the market the 
following condition has to be respected 
∆𝑠𝑖 − ∆𝑃𝑖
3𝑡
 < 0,5 (4) 
From this point each firm can find its profit maximizing prices (or response function) (xxx) 
and, by incorporating the other firm’s response function, equilibrium prices can be found, 
depending on the qualities, transportation costs and production costs of the different 
products (note that different qualities have different constant marginal costs of production. 
Firm i’s price at equilibrium will be: 
𝑝𝑖
∗ =
𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗 + 3𝑡 + 2𝑐𝑖 + 𝑐𝑗
3
 (5) 
With the second stage equilibrium prices firms’ profits at equilibrium can be easily 
determined, as a function of all marginal costs, qualities and transportation costs – please 
see equation (8) further in this section. Regarding the choice of quality three situations can 
happen: 
1. Both firms choose to offer the premium (high quality) fuel; 
2. One firm decides to offer the premium (high quality) fuel while the other chooses to 
offer the regular (lower quality) fuel; 
3. Both firms choose to offer the regular (low quality) fuel. 
Note that in the cases 1 and 3, where both firms offer the same quality, this exercise boils to 
a standard Hotelling line situation – with differentiation happening only in the horizontal 
dimension. Being the qualities and consequently the costs, the same for both firms, 
12 
 
competition dictates equal split of demand and profits between firms and the indifferent 
consumer has its location in the middle of the unit segment. Equilibrium prices are then 
equal across firms corresponding to the Hotelling model, yielding: 
𝑝∗ = 𝑝1 = 𝑝2 = 𝑡 + 𝑐 (6) 
 However, when situation 2 occurs differentiation is both in quality and location. Being the 
qualities chosen different prices will also be distinct. The difference in the equilibrium 




with ∆𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∆𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑐𝑗 ,  𝑗, 𝑠 = 1,2, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑠 
Making the assumption |∆𝑠𝑖| > |∆𝑐𝑖| it is an immediate result a higher price for the higher 
quality product and a lower price for the lower quality, when comparing to the prices that 
would emerge as an equilibrium in case of a market outcome of only one type of fuel being 
offered. Whatever the case, taking equilibrium prices and subsequent demand for those 













with ∆𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∆𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑐𝑗 ,  𝑗, 𝑠 = 1,2, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑠 
Note that, as indicated, situations 1 and 2 correspond symmetric demand and hence profits 
in equilibrium, being the former equal to 









Low Quality High Quality 
FIRM 1 






































Given one firm’s quality, the other firm’s profit difference between choosing the same or a 









with ∆𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∆𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑐𝑗 ,  𝑗, 𝑠 = 1,2, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑠 
∆𝜋 = ∆𝜋𝑖
𝐻 𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑗 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑛𝑒 
∆𝜋 = ∆𝜋𝑖
𝐿 𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑗 𝑡ℎ𝑒 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑛𝑒 
Table 1 provides information on the profits each firms obtains in the different outcomes. 
Note that from (10) it is clear that both ∆𝜋𝑖
𝐻and ∆𝜋𝑖
𝐿 are always positive. A direct 
implication is that the pairs (low; high) and (high; low) are subgame perfect Nash equilibria 
in pure strategies for quality choices - no firm has an incentive to unilaterally move away 
from that outcome. If a firm chooses “low” than the other firm would prefer to choose 
“high”, whereas if a firm chooses to play “high” than the other would find it more 
profitable to play “low”. The pairs (low; low) and (high; high) are never subgame perfect 
Nash equilibria, as both firms have incentives to deviate from such outcomes. 
Regarding the magnitude of the differences in profits from breaking from a (high; high) or 
(low; low) qualities equilibrium, the higher the difference in quality comparing to that of 
marginal costs – see equation (11) below – the bigger profits’ difference is. If it comes to a 
point where between fuels of different qualities, the cost of producing a higher quality 
14 
 
exactly equals the increase in quality, then no benefits are created form the form by 
changing the quality offered. The costs increase effect equals the quality increase effect 
leaving the profits unchanged. 
lim
∆𝑐𝑖→∆𝑠𝑖
∆𝜋𝑖 = 0 (11) 
4.2. Heterogeneous consumers and two qualities 
The indifferent consumer is that in such location that the following equality occurs: 
𝑣 + 𝜃𝑠1 − 𝑝1 − 𝑡(𝑥) =  𝑣 +  𝜃𝑠2 − 𝑝2 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥) (12)  
Rewriting the expression, one obtains firm 1’s market share for type 𝜃: 
𝑥(𝜃) =
𝜃(𝑠1 − 𝑠2) + 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 + 𝑡
2𝑡
(13) 











𝑠1 − 𝑠2 + 2(𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖)
4𝑡
 (14) 
From which the following condition is withdrawn to ensure that no firm is priced out of the 
market by the other firm:  
𝑠1 − 𝑠2 + 2(𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖)
4𝑡
< 0,5 (15) 
Employing the computed expressions for demand and performing the profits maximization 
in respect to own prices, profit-maximizing prices for each firm – response functions – are 











It immediately follows that whenever firms choose to offer the same quality, prices will be 
the same. If firms’ choice leads to quality differentiation, then the high quality fuel will also 
have a higher price – the higher the cost and quality gaps between the two qualities the 
higher the price difference – comparing to the low quality one.  
It is also interesting to analyze the effect of differentiation on the prices of the different 
products having as baseline the situation where the market offers only one quality. Whether 
the price of the high quality fuel offered by one firm (when the other firm offers the 
alternative quality) is higher or lower than the equilibrium price of that same quality when 
both firms offer it depends on the relations between cost and quality levels’ difference. The 















Note that the last term of the equation is always negative, while the penultimate is always 






 low cost product price is higher when firms differentiate and the high 







opposite occurs. Incorporating equilibrium prices in the profits function, profits in 
























with ∆𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∆𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑐𝑗 ,  𝑗, 𝑠 = 1,2, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑠 
As in the previous model, when firms do not differentiate themselves in the quality 
dimension, their profits in equilibrium are the same regardless of the quality offered. The 
exercise comes down to a Hotelling outcome. To find a hypothetical equilibrium it is 
essential to look at the possible payoff pairs resulting from the game: 
Table 2 - Payoffs (profits) by firm according to choice pairs (model 2) 
Firms’ choices 
FIRM 2 
Low Quality High Quality 
FIRM 1 






































Again, for simplicity of the analysis, considering the possibility of isolated modes from a 
first set of choices, ∆𝜋𝑖 represents the difference in profits one firm would face by moving 
from a situation where they offer the same quality, assuming that the other firm does not 










with ∆𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖 − 𝑠𝑗 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∆𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑐𝑗 ,  𝑗, 𝑠 = 1,2, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑠 
∆𝜋 = ∆𝜋𝑖
𝐻 𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑗 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑛𝑒 
∆𝜋 = ∆𝜋𝑖
𝐿 𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑗 𝑡ℎ𝑒 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑛𝑒 
From (19) it immediately follows that while ∆𝜋𝑖
𝐻 can be either positive or negative, ∆𝜋𝑖
𝐿 is 
always negative. There are thus two variations: when ∆𝜋𝑖
𝐻 is positive and ∆𝜋𝑖
𝐿 negative; 
when ∆𝜋𝑖
𝐻 is negative and ∆𝜋𝑖
𝐿 also negative. In the first case firms have an equilibrium in 
dominant strategies choosing to play “high” – leading to the outcome (high; high). That 
outcome is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in weekly dominant strategies, as any move 
17 
 
yields lower profits for the firm changing strategy and even allows the competitor to 
increase profits without having to change its strategy. When both elements are negative, 
situation to which, ceteris paribus, eventual increases in the transportation costs parameter t 
contribute, then firms have a symmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies in choosing not 
to differentiate in qualities – that is, both playing “high” or both playing “low”. Whatever 
the case, subgame perfect Nash equilibria is only present in scenarios where no vertical 
differentiation occurs It is also interesting to note that the more “sensitive” consumers are 













→       {
∆𝜋𝑖 > 0, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∆𝑠𝑖 ∈ [0; 1]
∆𝜋𝑖 < 0, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∆𝑠𝑖 ∈ [−1; 0]
 (20) 
Computations in (20) also present useful aspects. For a situation where both 
|∆𝑠𝑖|and|∆𝑐𝑖| ∈ [0; 1],  ∆𝜋𝑖 is always positive when a firm offers the high quality fuel 
whereas the opposite occurs when the low quality fuel is the firm’s choice.
14
 In this setting 
outcome (high; high) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies.
15
 
4.3. Heterogeneous non-continuous tastes and three qualities 
Initial analysis focuses on the situation where both firms offer the low-quality fuel, and 
then differentiate themselves in the remaining qualities (firm 1 offers the high-quality fuel 
and firm 2 offers the medium-quality fuel – this specific choice is irrelevant due to the 
symmetry of results in an opposite case). In order to perform the profits maximization that 
                                                          
14
 Consider the normalization𝑡 = 1 . 
15
 Note that ∆𝜋𝑖 < 0, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∆𝑠𝑖 ∈ [−1; 0], that is, firms have no incentive to switch its offer from the 
high quality fuel to the lower quality one, as it decreases own overall profits. 
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allow for the search of equilibrium prices, demands are obtained from the indifference 
relations present in this framework. It is assumed that consumers consume the quality 
“closer” to their tastes, meaning that whenever the market offers all qualities, consumers 
with lower taste for quality (𝜃𝑙) will only choose between low and medium qualities while 
consumers with higher taste for quality (𝜃ℎ) would choose only between high and medium 
qualities.  
Indifference relations: 
 For 𝜃ℎ consumers, between high and medium quality fuels (21); 
 For 𝜃𝑚consumers, between high and medium quality fuels (22); and between 
medium quality and low quality (supplied by firm 1) fuels (23) 
 For 𝜃𝑙 consumers, between medium quality and low quality (supplied by firm 1) 






















































 (25)  
Figure 2 – Firms’ and Consumers’ space of characteristics illustration 
 
Observing figure 2 the location of each of the indifferent consumers’ position entails 








𝐿 > 𝜃𝑚. This means that no 𝜃𝑚 consumer prefers 
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the high quality fuel over the low-quality fuel provided by firm 1; and no 𝜃𝑙consumer 
prefers the medium quality fuel over the low quality fuel supplied by firm 2, as the 








𝐿 < 𝜃𝑚 there would be no demand for firm 1’s low quality fuel. 
















































With demands, profits – at an aggregated level for each firm, that is, considering for each 
firm the costs, prices and demand associated with each specific product they offer – can be 
easily computed, allowing for the profit maximization exercise, in order to find equilibrium 
prices. Equilibrium prices found lead to specific demands (at equilibrium) and consequently 
profits. To test this market setting – where firms differentiate themselves in the quality-
choice available, given that both are required to offer the low quality fuel, these profits 
have to be compared to those arising from the other possible market configurations: both 
firms offering the low-quality and the medium quality fuels; or both firms offering the low 
quality and high quality fuels. In both these cases the exercise is simplified to a classical 
Hotelling. Regardless the assumptions – regarding consumers’ preferring always one 







Firms, by anticipating the possible outcomes of the game, will ultimately choose the 
strategy that leads to higher payoffs (profits). The following table shows the profits 
emerging for each of the firms according to the possible strategies. Although not 
specifically identified these are the aggregate profits – that is, also considering those arising 
from supplying the low-quality fuel – as the setting 
Table 3 - Payoffs (profits) by firm according to choice pairs (model 3) 
Firms’ choices 
FIRM 2 

































𝐻: 𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑗 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑛𝑒 
∆𝜋𝑖
𝑀: 𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑗 𝑡ℎ𝑒 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑛𝑒 
Again, ∆𝜋𝑖 represents the difference in the total profits one firm would face by moving 
from a situation where the two firms offer the same quality, assuming that the other does 
not change its own quality. Please see elements ∆𝜋𝑖
𝐻 and ∆𝜋𝑖
𝑀 in appendix (A.12) and 
(A.13) respectively. Strategies are choosing either medium or high quality. Assessing 
possible equilibria depends not only on the differences of costs and qualities but also on the 
transportation costs (t). If both ∆𝜋𝑖
𝐻 and ∆𝜋𝑖
𝐿are negative, then pairs (high; high) and (low; 
low) are symmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies – any deviation ∆𝜋𝑖 would decrease 
the deviant’s profits therefore firms will choose to minimal quality differentiation. By 
contrast, if ∆𝜋𝑖
𝐻 and ∆𝜋𝑖
𝐿 are both positive then the pairs (high; low) and (low; high) are 
asymmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In a different situation, 
where one deviation can yield higher profits and a deviation on the opposite direction yields 
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lower profits then firms will both – see the symmetric properties (32) –  have a weekly 
dominant strategy in choosing to offer the quality to which a deviation from a same-
qualities pair results in higher profits. The resulting outcome will be the pair of same 
strategies (resulting in minimal vertical differentiation) from which no firm will have 
incentives to unilaterally move away from and therefore, a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium in dominant strategies. 
 
These results, although limited in terms of interpretation, shed a light on how empty can 
policymakers’ arguments be when firms-level information is opaque or not available to the 
public and governments. Further exploring the possibilities of this model one can look at 
the welfare implications of mandatory low quality fuel provision. Since fully covered 
market is being assumed one can search for the welfare distribution for the agents in the 
market. That assumption is maintained for consistency’s sake. Although recognized that a 
welfare analysis under different conditions could also provide interesting results, it should 
follow configurations that account for non-fully covered markets.  Given that all consumers 
buy fuel (whatever the quality or provider) prices provide all information about their 
welfare in market configurations where firms offer the same qualities. In a situation where 




Comparing with the cases where: both firms offer the low-cost and medium qualities; and 
that where both firms offer medium and low quality; a market situation where no low-cost 
is offered and both firms supply the remaining qualities yields lower aggregate consumers’ 
expenditure. This suggests that consumers are worse off with this policy. In the alternative 
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situation where firms decide to differentiate themselves direction of the effect on 
consumers’ expenditure cannot be identified beforehand. It depends on the magnitude of 
the differences between costs and also on the differences between the tastes for quality of 
heterogeneous consumers. In the scope of this model without clear information about the 
preferences’ and costs’ parameters policymakers would not have the ability to anticipate 
consumers’ welfare variation. 
5 Conclusion 
This work aimed at exploring the challenges faced by fuel retailer firms as a result of 
legislation imposing mandatory supply of low quality fuel, and understanding the market 
implications of such measure. It has particularly focused on firms’ strategic behavior under 
capacity constraints and two-dimensional product differentiation. 
Results suggest that under no consumers’ heterogeneity firms have two asymmetric Nash 
equilibria in choosing to differentiate over the quality dimension, both earning positive and 
higher profits than comparing with the no-differentiation alternative. However, when 
consumer heterogeneity is maximal (and continuous), vertical differentiation is not a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Instead, either in pure strategies or weekly dominating 
strategies, firms have a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in opting for minimum quality 
differentiation. When no equilibria exist in pure strategies exists firms have a weekly 
dominating equilibrium in choosing to offer only high quality fuel. When considering a 
three-qualities setting firms’ preferable strategies can not be identified a priori. Consistent 
across all models is the clear role the differences in quality between products play on the 
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magnitude of the incentives firms may have to differentiate Differentiation can lead to both 
qualities being available at either higher or lower prices. Introduction of mandatory “low 
cost” fuels does not guarantee per si higher welfare to consumers. In fact, consumers can be 
jeopardized with such measure. If both firms offer exactly the same qualities consumers’ 
expenditure is higher than that verified when both firms offer medium and high qualities 
simultaneously. If firms choose to differentiate over the non-mandatory qualities the effect 
of consumers’ welfare is not clear, depending on the costs hiatus and level of consumer 
heterogeneity. After being required to offer “low-cost” fuel Portuguese retail firms chose a 
certain level of vertical differentiation as no quality was eliminated from the market.
16
 
Under duopoly and assumed maximal differentiation on the horizontal dimension there is 
no evidence supporting with certainty (without knowing firms’ costs and consumers’ 
preferences and perceptions) the maximal differentiation on both dimensions is a stable 
equilibrium, but neither is evidence excluding the possibility. 
This is merely a theoretical approach but the novelty of the policy studied demands further 
study. Empirical works could be developed with more transparent data allowing authors to 
test the robustness of theoretical models.
17
 Even without such data there is room for 
extending this work into considering settings comprising more firms in the market, search 
costs for consumers’, heterogeneous perceptions of quality and the ties between retail and 
higher levels on the vertical value chain of the fuels’ market. 
  
                                                          
16
 Repsol, Cepsa and BP eliminated the medium quality fuel while Galp eliminated the premium quality fuel. 
17
 Law no. 6/2015 (http://goo.gl/UA4mJy) stipulates that a report on the implications of the mandatory low 
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  (A-2) 
A.2 Model 3 
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